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INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE:
“FROM THE DIGITAL ECONOMY TO THE 
DIGITALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY”
INTRODUCTION AU NUMÉRO SPÉCIAL
Grazia Cecere, Institut Mines Telecom, Business School, LITEM
Thierry Pénard, CREM, Rennes 1
The Covid crisis has accelerated the digitalization of the economy. Many 
businesses have been forced to reorganize their production and distri-
bution channels. In response to the Covid-related restrictions (curfew, 
lockdown, etc.), firms have increased their investment in information 
technology to facilitate video calling, teleworking, or online ordering and 
payments. New digital businesses such as Zoom have boomed with the 
pandemic. These digital transformations are an irreversible process which 
is affecting both high tech and more traditional sectors.
The digitalization of the economy reduces the costs of economic activity—
e.g., search costs replication costs, transportation costs, tracking costs, and 
verification costs (Goldfarb and Tucker 2019). However, these efficiency 
gains are shared unequally among firms and consumers. Companies 
such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon (the so-called GAFAs) have 
become the winner-take-all of the digital transformations of markets. By 
taking advantage of economies of scale and network effects, these compa-
nies have outperformed traditional small, as well as large firms. The eco-
nomic tools being used by competition authorities are inadequate to assess 
digital competition policy. Thus, the market dominance of the GAFAs is 
challenging antitrust authorities in terms of how to deal with the aggres-
sive acquisitions of digital companies, the unfair practices of third-party 
sellers hosted on their marketplaces, and the exclusive agreements and 
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binding clauses imposed by Google, Apple, and Booking.com on its part-
ners. The European Commission has recently proposed a new regulatory 
framework that targets systemic platforms or “gatekeepers”. Under this 
framework, gatekeepers could be subject to more obligations and more 
severe behavioral and structural remedies in the case of infringements. 
However, achieving regulation of the digital economy that is fine-tuned 
to preserving both competition and consumer privacy without hindering 
innovation is difficulty, if not impossible. The prerequisite for any regula-
tion is a comprehensive view of the impacts of digitalization on the mar-
ket structure, intensity of competition, and consumer welfare. Achieving 
such a comprehensive assessment can be complex and can have ambiguous 
outcomes. Digital technologies may stimulate innovation, increase produc-
tivity, and improve market efficiency but they also induce greater market 
concentration and higher barriers to entry which may be detrimental to 
consumers. The wide diffusion of the Internet also has social and politi-
cal outcomes. Zhuravskay et al. (2020) highlights the ambivalent effects of 
broadband Internet and social media on democracy. Street protests against 
autocratic governments are growing alongside greater political polariza-
tion and greater mistrust of politicians which weaken democracy.
The objective of this Special Issue is to show how theoretical and 
empirical research conducted in Industrial Organization can provide 
a better understanding of the digital economy and the impact of dig-
italization on markets, competition, and public policy. It also aims to 
provide some guidance about the regulation of digital markets.
The main feature of digitalization is the decreasing costs of data collection 
and storage, and advances in business analytics that allow retrieval and 
analysis of unprecedented amounts of data (Acquisti et al., 2016). A large 
strand of marketing and industrial organization literature investigates 
how the exploitation of massive and personal data can generate new busi-
ness models and innovative services. The economics of privacy is gaining 
relevance in antitrust as data become the key to competitive advantage 
and insurmountable barriers to entry. In many markets, services are pro-
vided in exchange for data with no payment involved between consumers 
and firms. This poses a major challenge for competition policy which uses 
prices to delimit relevant markets. In addition, some recent mergers have 
underlined that sharing and monetizing data can be a strong motivation 
for mergers and acquisitions.
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Another feature of digital markets is the increasing use of algorithms to 
process these huge amounts of data. Algorithms are defined as a general 
purpose technology which can be applied to any sector and any domain 
and can generate increasing returns to scale (Agarwal et al., 2016). Machine 
learning algorithms are used to obtain insights from big data analysis to 
provide managerial and strategic advice for companies, and policy rec-
ommendations for regulators and policy makers (Varian 2014). Algorithms 
allow firms to exploit very large amounts of data in real time, and can 
be used to set dynamic pricing (Uber), to provide product recommenda-
tions (Amazon) and to offer personalized ads (Snapchat). They help firms 
to anticipate consumer demand in order to better allocate products and 
activities in a finer, more segmented market. Use of algorithms in the 
economy undoubtedly increases efficiency which can benefit firms and 
consumers in terms of new, more effective, and better-adapted products 
and services (Milgrom and Tadelis 2018). However, they can generate unin-
tended discrimination against some groups of individuals (Lambrecht and 
Tucker 2019). From a competition perspective, if algorithms lead to lower 
prices and better matching, they can improve social welfare (Miklós-Thal 
and Tucker 2019). However, algorithms can promote collusive behavior in 
the absence of any formal agreements or human interaction, and lead to 
anti-competitive outcomes (Calvano et al., 2020; OECD, 2017). 
It is also important to emphasize that digital platforms are at the heart of 
the digital economy and are ubiquitous. Their success is based on the pro-
vision of innovative algorithm-based services such as search engines, mar-
ketplaces, social media, streaming services, food delivery, etc. The theory 
of two-sided markets (that is at the origin of the economics of platform) 
uses three criteria to define a digital platform (Rochet and Tirole 2003, 
2006): i) the platform connects at least two groups of users, ii) the platform 
faces cross-group externalities and interdependent demands for its inter-
mediary services, and iii) the pricing structure determines the volume of 
interactions or transactions on the platform and the value created. Evans 
and Schmalensee (2014) propose a definition which captures the key fea-
tures of platform businesses. A multi-sided platform “has (a) two or more 
groups of customers; (b) who need each other in some way; (c) but who 
cannot capture the value from their mutual attraction on their own; and 
(d) rely on the catalyst to facilitate value creating interactions between 
them.” Platforms rely on price and non-price instruments which serve 
to achieve critical mass (i.e. to attract enough users on both sides, in the 
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right proportions) and stimulate network externalities. There is a large 
body of research on the pricing and non-pricing strategies of platforms 
under monopoly and competition settings. The launch and development 
of platform-based businesses and mergers between platforms have also 
received much attention. The economics of platforms is focused strongly 
on competition policy (Jullien and Sand-Zantman, 2020). The first part of 
this Special Issue contributes to this literature.
The first paper discusses competition and cooperation among digital plat-
forms. Adrien Raizonville explores the price and welfare effects of coope-
tition between two platforms in the context of a competitive bottleneck 
which occurs when the users on one side of the market single-home, while 
the users on the other side multi-home. His paper shows that when plat-
forms coordinate their pricing on the multi-homing side of the market 
and compete on the single-homing side, the multi-homers are worse off 
and the single-homers are better off. Moreover, coopetition may be detri-
mental for platforms, but may be welfare-increasing compared to full com-
petition. This model shows that cooperation between platforms can have 
ambiguous effects on prices, and suggests that the antitrust authorities 
must exercise caution when dealing with such cases.
Dominique Torre and Qing Xu’s paper on “Digital payment in China: adop-
tion and interactions among application” examines competition between 
two Chinese payment platforms: Alipay and WeChat Pay. These mobile 
payment services provided by Alibaba and Tencent have spread rapidly 
throughout China in the last ten years. The theoretical model seeks to 
explain why the incumbent platform did not prevent the entry of the 
second payment platform. The article develops an adoption model which 
mimics the competition between these two service providers. The authors 
point out that complementarities between the two solutions (differenti-
ated services offered to clients, decreasing adoption costs, and contrast-
ing business models) may explain why these two service providers have 
avoided fierce competition. 
The article by Arrah-Marie Jo describes the phenomenon of crowdsourc-
ing platforms which use the crowd to find new ideas or solve problems, 
and analyses the conditions of their success. She focuses on a bug bounty 
program platform. Bug bounty or vulnerability rewarding programs are 
used by companies to improve their system security. They offer monetary 
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rewards to individuals who find and disclose bugs or flaws in pieces of 
software or software systems. Arrah-Marie Jo explains that a major chal-
lenge when designing these programs is being able to attract high-skilled 
and talented participants, so-called hackers. She examines the motiva-
tions for hackers to participate in these programs and finds that infor-
mation provision and compensation schemes are important, with some 
trade-off between inducing higher rates of participation and attracting 
more valuable participants.
Traditional industries are being challenged by the digital revolution. The 
relations of hotels with platforms such as Booking.com and Airbnb show 
that digitalization can be both a threat and an opportunity in sectors such 
as tourism. Also, the financial sector is being strongly affected by the rise 
of finTechs which provide innovative services which may be complemen-
tary to or substitute for existing bank and insurance company services. 
Digitalization is transforming traditional markets and creating new mar-
kets. This Special Issue provides a series of contributions explaining the 
impact of digitalization in several sectors such as banking, media, and 
transportation. 
The widespread use of social media influences the quality of informa-
tion goods. This applies particularly to cultural goods and journalistic 
information. However, there is no consensus on the definition and meas-
urement of quality which refer to very different dimensions and social 
expectations. The article by Lyubareva, Rochelandet, and Haralambous 
characterizes the quality of journalistic information along the vertical 
and horizontal axes of differentiation. The authors use semantic analysis 
methods to define the editorial choices of news providers. They compare 
93,0000 newspaper articles related to 31 events that occurred between 
2015 and 2019, published by 55 representative French journals, and they 
provide a mapping of French media based on their different representa-
tions, and classify them according to content and quality.
The article by Blayac, Reymond, and Stéphan, entitled “Can digital tech-
nologies induce behavioral changes in transportation habits? Evidence 
based on user experience of the SmartMoov application ‘’ shows how the 
use of mobile applications could change transportation behavior. The 
researchers conducted a three-month experiment in the Montpellier area 
based on the smartphone application SmartMoov. The empirical evidence 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE
16 R E V U E D ’ÉC O N O MIE IND U S T R IE L L E ➻  N ° 17 2  ➻  4 E T R IME S T R E 2 0 2 0
provided by the data observed during the field test shows that consumers 
were sensitive to the information provided by the mobile application, and 
were likely to modify their mobility behavior in terms of changing their 
routes and departure times. The authors highlight a gender effect in their 
results as women are more likely to adapt their behavior in response to 
the suggestions of the mobile app.
The final article is by Omrani and Soulié and is entitled “Privacy experi-
ence, privacy perception, political ideology and online privacy concern: 
The case of data collection in Europe.” This article is motivated by the fact 
that consumers with privacy concerns might choose not to share their per-
sonal data or use services that collect too much data. The authors investi-
gate the link between consumers’ privacy concerns and political ideology. 
They exploit a rich data set which includes more than 14,000 Internet 
users from 26 European countries. They examine which individual, social, 
and contextual factors affect privacy concerns. The evidence shows that 
most individuals consider health and financial data to be sensitive infor-
mation. They find also that individuals who have experienced privacy 
intrusions in the past tend to be less concerned about privacy. They show 
that the individuals with politically-left leanings are more concerned 
about privacy than their right-oriented counterparts. This article offers 
some important insights into how privacy concerns can constrain busi-
ness models and regulation.
This Special Issue does not cover all of the topics related to the digital 
economy but it does allow a better understanding of the competition and 
regulation issues in digital markets. There is no doubt that digital econom-
ics is more than a new economic research field; it is entailing a renewal of 
industrial economics. The research questions and challenges linked to the 
digitalization of the economy are so numerous that they should capture 
the attention of many scholars in the immediate future.
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